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'

CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss-RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION TO PREVIOUSLY BARRED CLAIM-In 1943 appellee
Rowley, filed claim with the Department of Labor and Industry, under the
Washington Industrial Insurance Act,1 for compensation for aggravation of an
injury suffered, while employed by appellant in 1937, in the course of his employment. The claim was barred by a provision of the then existing statute 2 •
which placed a three year limit on the filing of such claims; but by amendment 3
in I 94 I· the time limit was extended to five years, with a proviso, under which
appellee claimed, that "any such applicant whose compensation has heretofort
been established or terminated shall have five years from the taking effect of this
act within which to apply for such readjustment." Under neither law was a
time limit imposed on the department's pow_er to reopen the claim on its own
. motion to determine aggravation or termination of in juries. Vnder the Washington Act individual cost experience comprised 60 per cent of the tax charge.:
able to appellant the following year for the maintenance of the Industrial Insurance Fund.4 Since the allowance 'of Rowley's once-outlawed claim would
result in 'an increased charge against appellant by reference to the individual cost
experience factor, appellant challenged the proviso as a retroactive measure which
deprived it of its property without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. _The Washington Supreme Court z:eversed the. department's denial ·
of Rowley's claim.5 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, appeal
dismissed. An employer under the W asliington Industrial Insurance Act does
not suffer such a certain or substantial injury in the granting of an award to his
employee that he may contest the constitutionality of the award: Two Justices
voted to affirm the judgment below. Gange Lumber Company v. Rowley,
(U.S. 1945) 66 S. Ct. 125.
Although the Court disposed of the appeal by denying that the ap~ellant's
interest was sufficient to permit ,him to raise a constitutional issue, 6 both the
majority and minority opinions· considered and rejected appellant's arguments
Wash. Laws (1911) c. 74, p. 345; Wash. Rev. Stat.' (Remington, 1932)
·
2 Wash. Laws (1927) c. 310, § 4(h), p. 844; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington,
1932) § 7679 (h).
8 Wash. Laws ( 1941) c. 209, § I; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, Supp. 1941)
§ 7679.
·
.
. ·
4 The Wa'shington law provides the following insurance features: classification of
Washington industries according to hazard; a separate fund for each class; a privilege tax
for the maintenance of this. fund, assessed against the employer, based ,60 per cent on
the individual employer's cost experience for the preceding five years, 40 per cent on
the group cost experience for the preceding two years; an upper limit on this tax of I 60
per cent of the basic class rate; adjustment of the rate according to the current condition of the fund.
,
5 Lane v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 21 Wash. (2d) 420, 151 P. (2d) 440
1

§§ 7673 et seq.

( 1 944).
6 In Mattson v. Department of Labor, 176 Wash. 345, 29 P. (2d) 675 (1934),
the Washington Supreme, Court had held that accident insurance funds were public
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on the merits and reaffirmed, in so doing, the doctrine of Campbell 'll. Holt.7
It was there decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not preclude the
retroactive extension of statutes of limitation to tort and contract claims already barred 8 under a previous statute, observing, however, a distinction as
_to property claims founded in adverse possession which were held to create ·
in the defendant a vested right. 9 As to contract and tort actions it was said
that the defendant acquired no vested right in his defense by virtue of the
limitation, which was construed as terminating plaintiff's remedy but
not his right. In support of this distinction between right and remedy,
the Court relied on the rule allowing the right to be asserted after the
remedy was barred if defendant waived the defense of the statute, and on the
rule allowing the right to be recognized in a foreign country whose limitation
did not bar the action.10 This conception of rights existing apart from remedies
for their enforcement has been thought too tenuous by a majority of the state
courts, which construe statutes of limitation as being statutes of repose creating
vested rights capable of protection under due process clauses of state constitumonies in which neither employer nor employee had any vested rights. Consequently,
appellant based his injury on the antcipated effect of the award on the yearly computation of the privilege tax for the ensuing five years. The court, after considering the
meagre size of the award ($460.50), the fact that it would directly affect only 60 per
cent of the tax, and the fact that it yvould be averageq with awards to appellant's employees for a five year period-all indications that appellant's injury would be insubstantial-pointed out that appellant had not proved the certainty of any damage by
failing to prove (1) that he was not already paying the maximum of 160 per cent of
the basic class rate, and (2) that the class fund was not in such a condition that no tax
would be required at all. (See note 5, supra).· Yet, as the minority opinion pointed
out, since the employer's damage, if any, will be spread over five successive annual
taxes, it will never be possible for an employer to prove. the condition of the fund
as well as the amount of his own cost experience in the future. Hence, no employer
will ever be able to challenge the constitutionality of any award, despite its obvious
effect over the years upon an employer's cost of operations. The minority suggested
that it would be equally reasonable to exclude the employer's claim because of the
possibility that fire or some other cataclysm might put him out of business before the
apprehended damage was suffered. It can hardly be said of the employer challenging
a claim of his own employee that he " ••• suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally," in the language of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 at
488, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923), denying the interest of a federal taxpayer to challenge
federal appropriations. Cf. Copperweld Steel Company v. Industrial Commission of
Ohio, 324 U.S. 780, 65 S. Ct. 1006 (1945).
.
1 IIS U.S. •620, o S. Ct. 209 (1885). Accord: Donaldson v. Chase Securities
Corp., 216 Minn. 269, 13 N.W. {2d) l (1943); Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101,
258 P. 1039 (1927); Orman v. Van Arsdell, 12 N.M. 344, 78 P. 48 (1904). See
federal cases collected at 133 A.L.R. 388 (1941).
8 It is generally conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a
state legislature from extending the limitation as to claims pending and not yet barred
under the previous limitation. See cases collected at 46 A.L.R. 1101 (1927).
9 For cases illustrating the general rule that vested rights accrue to the holder of
property for the statutory period, see 133 A.L.R. 384 at 386 (1941).
1 Citing Jpnes v. Jones, 18 Ala. 248 (1850); Williams v. Jones, 13 East 439,
104 Eng. Rep. 441 (1811).
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tions.11 A few cases have adopted an intermediate position which 'recognizes
legislative power.to enact remedial measures in hardship cases, without subscribing to either interpretation of such statutes as an immutable rule.12 The reasoning of Campbell v. Holt has not been thought applicable 'to.claims arising out
of statutes containing their own limitation, it being there held that the limitation
becomes part of the definition of the right, which is extinguished along with the
remedy when the action is barred, and which may not be reinstated consistently
with the requirements of due process.13 Appellant placed its reliance on this exception. The Washington Industrial Insurance Act terminated common law
causes of action of employees and substituted a statutory claim against the insurance fund. Appellees, however, asserted that the law- could not be a statute of
non-claim nor the limitation a law of repose because of the department's power.
to reopen the claim, at any time, on its own motion. Because of this perpetual
power the employer could never claim- to have a vested right in the settlement of
his employee's claims. Thus was presented to the Court a situation which was at
once within the rule of Campbell v. Holt and the exception carved from it-a
situation where the right had been terminated while the liability survived. Without extended discussion the Court observed that the employer's liability and the
employee's right were not cbrrelative and that because no vested right had accrued in the employer's favor, the case was within the holding of Campbell 'lJ.
Holt. It thus appears that the legislature is free to enact retroactive limitations
if either the plaintiff's right or the defendant's liability survives the bar of the
limitation. The reasoning would appear to include cases where one of several
alternate causes of action has ·been barred or where one of several bases of liability in a single cause has been barred. The latter was the case in Chase Securities
Corp. v. Donaldson,14 decided the previous term, where plaintiff sued to recover
the purchase price. of unregistered securities, proceeding under both common law
and statutory definitions of defendant's duty. Subsequent to :1-n appeal to the
11 Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373, 79 N.W. 433 {1899); Raymer v. Comley Lumber Co., 169 Okla. 576, 38 P. (2d) 8 (1934); Wasson v. State,
187 Ark. 537, 60 S.W. (2d) 1020 (1933); Tennant v. Hulet, 65 lncJ. App. 24, 116
N.E. 748 (1917); Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6, 164 S.W. 752_{1914); Board of
Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 40 N.E. 1025 (1895); McCracken County v. Mer- cantile Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344, 1 S.W. 585 (1886); Whitehurst v. Dey~ 90 N.C.
542 (1884). For criticical comment on the doctrine of Campbell v. Holt, see 2
CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 760 at seq. (1927); 1 Woon, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 4th ed., § II at pp. 47-49 (1916); IO CoRN. L. Q. 212 (1925);
24 CoL. L. REv. 803 (1924).
12 Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59 N.E. 1033 (1901); Dunbar
v. Boston & Providence R.R. Corp_., 181 Mass. 383, 63 N.E. 916 (1902) ;' Robinson
v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 238 N.Y. 271, 144 N.E. 579 (1924), where the
statutory remedy under whicli P was drawing a monthly award was declared unconstitutional after the common law remedy had been barred--subsequent curative act extending the common law remedy held valid.
18 Danzer & Co., Inc. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 45 S. Ct. 612
(1925); Interstate Commerce Act; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S. Ct. 692 (1904)
(state foreign corporations law); Link v. S~aboard Air Line R. Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1934)
73 F. (2d) 149 (wrongful death act); Bussey v. Bishop, 169 Ga. 251, I 50 S.E. 78
(1929) (workman's compensation law).
14 325 U.S. 304, 65 S. Ct. 1137 (1945).
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Minnesota Supreme Court,15 which determined that the Blue Sky limitaton had
been barred, that limit was extended so as to revive plaintiff's claim. The United
States Supreme Court held that the Blue Sky Law merely defined a common law
duty, that the common law cause of action which it in part defined remained intact to preserve defendant's liability. The Court reasserted the doctrine that
statutes of limitation are arbitrary definitions of public policy regarding the privilege to litigate, not intended to create vested rights in defense to tort and contract actions, and held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the legislature
to restate that policy as regards such actions already barred. Whatever view
may be adopted as to the rule of Campbell v. Holt, the results reached in both the
Chase Securities case and the principal case appear justifiable. For were it conceded that a defendant acquired a vested right in a defense involving his entire
liability, the same result should not be reached as to a defense to a particular
remedy, where the liability continued on another footing. 16 Whatever degree of
repose is conceived to be the legislative intent in creating a limitation, it can
hardly be thought to extend to repose qualified by continuing liability on the same
transaction. An interesting aspect of the opinion in the Chase Securities case is
the Court's defense of Campbell 'O. Holt, which the Court was asked to overrule
in consideration of the general disapproval accorded it by state courts. The
Court observed that the ease with which state constitutions can be amended
might well prompt state courts to adopt constructions limiting legislative powers,
whereas a contrary construction was necessary as to the federal Constitution. It
thus appears that a doctrine originating in a now widely discredited interpretation of_statutes of limitations has earned survival as a means of implementing the
present Court's attitude towar~ due process as a tool of judicial review.
lames R. Bliss

Donaldson v. Chase Securities Corp., 209 Minn. 165, 296 N.W. 518 (1941).
Power v. Telford, 60 Miss. 195 (1882); Gotham National Bank v. Strunsky,
162 Misc. 673, 293 N.Y.S. 961 (1936).
111
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